Sunsetting Judicial Opinions by Katyal, Neal K.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2004 
Sunsetting Judicial Opinions 
Neal K. Katyal 
Georgetown University Law Center, katyaln@law.georgetown.edu 
 
Vol. 79 Notre Dame Law Review, Page 1237 (2004). Reprinted with permission. © Notre Dame 
Law Review, University of Notre Dame. 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/531 
 
79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237-1256 (2004) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237 2003-2004
SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
Neal Katyal* 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary constitutional law, in its quest for judicial re-
straint, has primarily focused on "the how" of judging-what interpre-
tive methods will constrain the decisionmaker? This Article, by 
contrast, focuses on the "when"-if there are reasons to think that 
today's judicial decisions might later prove to be problematic, then 
are there methods that alter the timing of those decisions' impact to 
produce better outcomes? This Article outlines one new method for 
judicial decisionmaking in the post-gill world. Informed by perva-
sive legislative practices, I contend that the Supreme Court should 
prospectively declare that some of its national security opinions will 
sunset, meaning that they will lapse as binding precedent. 
Federal and state legislatures already employ a timing based 
mechanism when they are concerned about the long-term wisdom of 
a particular bill: the sunset clause is a favored method to avoid freez-
ing law into place. For example, in the debates over the USA PA-
TRIOT Act,l some thought that Congress had gone too far with the 
draft legislation, and feared that enacting a law quickly after the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, might eventually prove to be an over-
reaction. A compromise was reached to sunset the Act, so that many 
of its provisions would be erased from the books within four years. 
Formally speaking, of course, even without a sunset, Congress always 
had the power to repeal the Act, but politicians on both sides of the 
aisle understood that such formality obscures the pervasive phenome-
non of legislative inertia. The sunset was the principal device to en-
sure that the dramatic changes brought about by the USA PATRIOT 
Act would be questioned again, so that any bad law it contained would 
not stay on the books without the affirmative act of reauthorization. 
* John Carroll Research Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272. 
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Today, we are asking the federal courts to do far more in balanc-
ing individual rights and national security than we have asked of the 
Congress. There are any number of reasons for this trend, predomi-
nant among them the Administration's dramatic assertions of unilat-
eral power and maneuvering to avoid legislation on critical issues. 2 
Judicial resolution of these national security questions, however, is 
fraught with problems similar to those that beset the legislature. Con-
sider the claims made about legislators and the USA PATRIOT Act: 
the tendency to overreact to a crisis, the dynamics of limited informa-
tion, the all-too-human desire for security to trump abstract ideals like 
liberty and equality. All of these observations apply to jurists as well. 
And the judiciary has two features that the legislature lacks: judges are 
largely unaccountable (in that they cannot be removed for unpopular 
decisions, whereas legislators who voted for a particular bill, such as 
the USA PATRIOT Act, can) and their decisions are entitled to stare 
decisis. Given these characteristics, it is quite surprising that no one 
has yet advocated judicial sunsets. 
The lack of attention to judicial sunsets is even more surprising 
when one reads perhaps the most famous case of last term, Grutter v. 
Bollinger. 3 In that case, Justice 0' Connor, writing for a majority of the 
Court, stated: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest ap-
proved today."4 While some overeager folks are already engaging in a 
debate about what her statement means, at least one way to view it is as 
a judicial sunset. On this reading, Justice O'Connor was worried 
about a holding by the Court that would prevent affirmative action 
policies at universities from being contested in perpetuity. 
Yet routinely we are given, as the answer to the most thorny na-
tional security/civil liberties dilemmas of the day, precedent from 
long ago. Are military tribunals constitutional? Well, the answer to 
that turns on what the Supreme Court said in 1942.5 Are enemy 
aliens stripped of their rights to habeas corpus? Well, the answer to 
that turns on what the Supreme Court said in 1950.6 And so on and 
so on. The debate here is stultifying and unilluminating. The answers 
to these vital questions should not turn, in any meaningful way, on 
2 Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Mili-
tary Tribunals, III YALE LJ. 1259, 1260 (2002) (providing examples). 
3 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
4 [d. at 2347. 
5 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44, 48 (1942) (holding the trial of Nazi saboteurs 
by military tribunals constitutional). 
6 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-81 (1950) (holding that an enemy 
alien cannot obtain a writ of habeas corpus). 
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what a handful of Justices may have thought a half-century ago, in a 
different world, with different legal standards.7 Rather, they have to 
be decided by contemporary Justices translating the time-honored 
principles of our Constitution to facts of the modern era.s 
Part I puts forth a theory for why judicial sunsets are necessary. 
The justification will turn not only on the need to avoid freezing bad 
law into place, but also on the impact the sunset will have for agenda 
setting. Because federal courts are passive creatures, and can only de-
cide cases that come before them, pronouncements by the Supreme 
Court chill future litigation throughout the judiciary that questions 
the logic of previous decisions. As such, the reasoning and holding of 
Supreme Court decisions are not subject to a great deal of testing over 
time. Those brave litigants who seek to reopen a previous holding 
face the double-barreled certainty of losing at the federal district court 
and the court of appeals stages-for judges at each stage are bound to 
follow Supreme Court precedent, no matter how stale. Part II will 
then use the theory to explain how the judiciary could approach two 
pressing national security issues: the legality of military tribunals and 
the ability of detainees abroad to file habeas corpus actions in federal 
courts. 
I. THE VIRTUES OF SUNSETS 
A. The Legislative Sunset 
The case for legislative sunsets is a familiar one. Congress, faced 
with the crisis du jour, has a tendency to overreact on the basis of 
limited information. We can see this both in cases where sunsets have 
been applied (such as the Independent Counsel Act)9 as well as ones 
where they have not (such as the crack cocaine mandatory-minimum 
7 This is not a claim for a "living Constitution," since the judgments earlier in 
time, like 1942 or 1950, may themselves have been incompatible with the original 
understanding of the Constitution as well. Rather, the claim here is that whichever 
constitutional methodology is selected, judges may err in their implementation of it-
and that today's judges should not be bound by the mistakes of their predecessors. 
Of course, there are often times when evolving events may change a constitutional 
determination and aid the Court in interpreting the text. See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 
8 My claim in this Article is limited to the Supreme Court. Many of the argu-
ments in favor of judicial sunsets apply to lower court judges as well, but they lack the 
national stare decisis power of the Supreme Court, and may have dissimilar resources. 
Similarly, my claims are confined to national security cases, and not other realms 
where temporary overreaction in the name of security might not be endemic and 
where the advantages of settled law may be greater. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 591 (2000). 
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penalties).10 The overreaction could, in theory, be cured in subse-
quent years by new legislation, but in practice that rarely happens. 
And so we have any number of old statutes on the books that do not 
reflect modern und~rstandings, whether they are criminal prohibi-
tions on adulteryll and sodomy,12 drinking coffee,13 or on non-males 
dressing as Santa.14 Because it is so much harder to get legislatures to 
do something than it is to get them not to do something, statutes lin-
ger on the books long after they should be revised or removed. And 
so, when states have adopted sunset provisions, for example, the up-
shot has been dramatic change and innovation: one in five agencies 
that are reviewed under sunsets are terminated, one in three are mod-
ified, and "less than half' of such agencies are "re-created with little or 
no change."15 As this experience shows, the legislative sunset can help 
remedy the natural inertia of the legislature. 
The inertia problems at the national level are compounded by 
our constitutional system, which gives the President veto power. In 
order to modify or remove existing legislation, it may take a 
10 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). 
11 See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Mass. 1983) (uphold-
ing criminal prohibition on adultery). 
12 Numerous statutes criminalizing private, unforced, noncommercial acts of sex-
ual intimacy among persons legally able to consent persisted until being struck down 
by courts. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (striking down 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003»; Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 
353-54 (Ark. 2002) (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997»; Powell v. State, 510 
S.E.2d 18,22 (Ga. 1998) (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (2003»; Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498, 501 (Ky. 1992) (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Banks-Bald-
win 1995»; Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997) (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-505 (2003»; People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943 (N.Y. 1980) (N.Y. PENAL LAw 
§§ 130.38,130.40 (McKinney 1998»; Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1986) (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (West 2002»; Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 
A.2d 47,51 (Pa. 1980) (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101, 3124 (2000), repealed by Act 
of March 31, 1995, 1995 Pa. Laws 985 § 7); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 
266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (2003». 
13 ROBERT WAYNE PELTON, LOONEY LAws THAT You NEVER KNEW You WERE 
BREAKING 8 (1990). In Corvallis, Oregon, "there's a strict curfew for women. 'Young 
ladies' are expressly forbidden to drink any coffee after the hour of 6 p.m." [d. 
14 [d. at 33 ("Beware if you just happen to be a female and live anywhere in the 
State of Minnesota. It's illegal for a woman to dress up and try to impersonate Santa 
on any city street. Violators can get fined up to $25 and/or thirty days in the local 
jail.") . 
15 MARK R. DANIELS, TERMINATING PUBLIC PROGRAMS: AN AMERICAN POLITICAL PAR-
ADOX 34 (1997). For an extensive summary of state sunset provisions, see STAFF OF 
THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, 97TH CONG., A COMPILATION OF 
STATE SUNSET STATUTES (Subcomm. Print 1983). 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1241 2003-2004
SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
supermajority rather than a simple majority.16 Ex ante, the threat 
alone of the veto pen itself can prevent legislative revisions from bub-
bling up to the surface. So, too, the Constitution's insistence on bi-
cameralism can stymy legislative change-even if 90% of the House of 
Representatives wants to modify an existing law, the Senate can thwart 
it (and perhaps even a minority of the Senate, given the filibuster, can 
do so). As such, even when a majority of Congress's members want to 
change a law that is already on the books, it can require substantial 
effort, energy, and political capital to translate that majority wish into 
successful legislation. In short, the Constitution incorporates struc-
tural features that predispose the legislature to inertia. 17 
Alongside the structural and political forces for inertia lies the 
obvious point that legislatures, composed of human beings, cannot 
anticipate every problem and are likely to make mistakes. As John 
Maynard Keynes put the problem when WTiting about Weimar 
Germany: 
We cannot expect to legislate for a generation or more. The secular 
changes in man's economic condition and the liability of human 
forecast to error are as likely to lead to mistake in one direction as 
in another. We cannot as reasonable men do better than base our 
policy on the evidence we have and adapt it to the five or ten years 
over which we may suppose ourselves to have some measure of pre-
vision; and we are not at fault if we leave on one side the extreme 
chances of human existence and of revolutionary changes in the 
order of Nature or of man's relations to her.18 
16 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7: 
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with 
his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter 
the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after 
such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it 
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it 
shall become a law. 
17 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961): 
They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-
making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at 
any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is 
favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which 
may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compen-
sated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones. 
18 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 190 
(1920). 
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The costs of this inevitable human error are therefore exacerbated 
over time as bad or outmoded legislation stays on the books due to 
inertia. 
These structural, political, and human error variables have in-
duced many to support legislative sunsets. With the Independent 
Counsel Act, for example, a sunset was built into the law so that after 
five years, the statute would immediately lapse. 19 Because the notion 
of a independent counsel was, at the very least, unfamiliar to our con-
stitutional system, and because the policy implications were so severe, 
Congress decided to impose a sunset.20 Looking back in hindsight, it 
is easy to see just how wise that decision was. It would have been ex-
traordinarily difficult, given the political repercussions, for members 
of Congress to stand up and say that they are "against independent 
investigations" and "against ethics in government." Yet the Indepen-
dent Counsel Act produced a constitutional monster, accountable to 
no one. Because of the sunset mechanism, now, fortunately, no Inde-
pendent Counsel Act is on the books. It was simply too difficult, in 
the wake of Iran-Contra and the Whitewater/Lewinsky investigations, 
for members of Congress to stand up and affirmatively persuade their 
colleagues that the Act had to bei'eenacted. 
Similar considerations led to the sunset provision in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act. The debate on the proposed legislation produced a 
range of opinions, and led Yale Law School professor Bruce Acker-
man to propose that the law sunset after a time. 21 Despite the objec-
19 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, § 2, 
108 Stat. 732, 732. 
20 See S. REp. No. 95-170, at 76-77: 
Section 598 is a sunset provision which states that all of the provisions of the 
new Chapter 39 ... will cease to have effect five years after the date on which 
it takes effect . . . . Five years is a reasonable time period to permit the 
provisions of this chapter to operate and then to review those provisions to 
see if too many or too few special prosecutors have been appointed, to deter-
mine whether there is a need for a revision of the standards defining when a 
conflict of interest exists, or to determine if there is a need to revise the 
method of appointment, the method of removal, or any other significant 
portion of this chapter. 
Jd.; H.R. REp. No. 95-1307, at 11 ("Section 598, 'Termination of effect of chapter,' is 
in essence a sunset provision for the special prosecutor mechanism .... The purpose 
of this provision is to enable the Congress to review how the legislation has operated 
in order to determine whether the mechanism should be retained or changed."). 
21 See Bruce Ackerman, Sunset Can Put a Halt to Twilight of Liberty, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 2001, at Bl5. Ackerman notes that 
[i]t is one thing to pass emergency legislation; quite another to make it a 
permanent part of our law. Any congressional enactment should come with 
a sunset provision, requiring the law to lapse after two years unless it is reen-
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tions of Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Ackerman proposal 
appeared in the House version of the bil1.22 House Majority Leader 
Dick Armey explained that "[t]hese tools give the government much 
increased capability to do surveillance on American citizens," but that 
"the sunset is a very important matter with a lot of our members"23 
because it affords an opportunity to "see how well [the Act's provi-
sions] work, how effective they've been, and how responsibly these 
tools have been used. Our rights as citizens are a big part of what 
we're fighting for."24 
In the final and ultimately successful version of the legislation, 
section 224 specified sunsets for various aspects of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. Designated for sunset are provisions that, for example, govern 
the authority to intercept wire communications relating to terrorism, 
liberalize the sharing of intelligence information within the United 
States government, authorize roving surveillance, permit the govern-
ment to engage in broad third party searches for records, and author-
ize the seizure of voice-mai1.25 As Senator Leahy has recently 
remarked, section 224 permits review and reconsideration of these 
grants of power to law enforcement before they are "etched into 
stone."26 
Id. 
acted. During the interim, Congress should create a bipartisan commission 
to consider the fundamental questions at stake. Then, we can consider 
more permanent legislation after the initial panic has subsided. 
22 Karen Hosler, Bills Would Give Ashcroft Many Anti-Terrorism Tools; Attorney Gen-
eral Seeks to Remove Time Limits, BALT. SUN, Oct. 10, 2001, at 7A ("Ashcroft's hope was 
to produce a bill with no sunset, or perhaps one with a five year limit. 'No one can 
guarantee that terrorism will sunset in two years,' Ashcroft said ... ."). 
23 Id. ("[He] estimated that much of the House support for the measure was 
based on [the] principle [of sunsetting]."); see also Nat Hentoff, Terrarizing the Bill of 
Rights, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 2001, at 30. (stating that Senator Paul Wellstone 
"while troubled by the bill, felt reassured because of its 'sunset' provision .... 'It is 
critically important that each and every one, every senator and representative, moni-
tor the use of new authorities provided to the law enforcement agents to conduct 
surveillance. We're going to have to monitor this very closely.'''). 
24 Hosler, supra note 22. 
25 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001). 
26 See, e.g., 149 CONGo REc. S12,283 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
With the PATRIOT Act, Congress provided government investigators with a 
virtual smorgasbord of new powers from which to choose . . . . Have we 
provided too many choices and too much power to a limited few? These are 
questions that require answers before the more far-reaching provisions of 
PATRIOT are etched into stone. 
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B. The Judicial Sunset 
To my knowledge, no one has yet reflected upon, or advocated, 
judicial sunsets. This is not surprising since the standard conception 
of stare decisis is binary-either precedent should be given weight or 
it should not. And while some of the conditions for strong adherence 
to stare decisis have been enumerated (unanimity, recency, crystalliza-
tion of social expectations), little discussion has taken place around 
the question of what methods a majority of the Court may use to sig-
nal its hesitation about freezing a legal principle into place. 
It was perhaps because the language of judicial sunsets had not 
been invented, that the one possible recent example of it, Crutter, was 
itself hazy. Some of the haze is due, no doubt, to the way in which the 
Court shoehorned the sunset into the opinion. The Supreme Court 
for years has insisted on affirmative action having a "logical stopping 
point."27 But this stopping point was one internal to the program-
the term was meant to refer to the time period in the affirmative ac-
tion policy where the preference should end. In Crutter, however, the 
Court appears to have imposed an external, judicial stopping point-
one that had nothing to do with the University of Michigan policy. 
The Court said, in essence, that it did not want to give the University 
carte blanche for all time.28 This does not really appear to be a claim 
about a "logical stopping point" as such; rather, it appears to be one 
about the vitality of a Supreme Court opinion in the face of evolving 
circumstances. 
Regardless of whether this 'Judicial sunset" reading of Crutter is 
descriptively correct, the above characterization of it enumerates a 
possible template for such sunsets. That is, the Court can hand down 
an opinion and announce that its holding is entitled to the full effect 
of the stare decisis doctrine for a set number of years (e.g., "In five 
[d. Similar arguments are voiced in favor of state sunset provisions. See, e.g., COMMON 
CAUSE, THE STATUS OF SUNSET IN THE STATES 3 (1982) ("The automatic termination 
provision is an action-forcing mechanism to require state legislators to conduct seri-
ous program evaluation."); DOUG ROEDERER & PATSY PALMER, SUNSET, EXPECTATION 
AND EXPERIENCE 13 (1981) (suggesting a similar point). 
27 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (directing the 
lower court to examine "whether the program was appropriately limited such that it 
'will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate'''); Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (rejecting" [t]he dissent's watered-
down version of equal protection review [because it] effectively assures that race will 
always be relevant in American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] en-
tirely from governmental decision making such irrelevant factors as a human being's 
race,' will never be achieved") (citation omitted). 
28 See Crutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary .... "). 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1245 2003-2004
SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 1245 
years, we will be completely open to reconsideration of these 
claims."), or that it will be binding law until a designated event (e.g., 
"Following the cessation of hostilities with Japan and Germany, we will 
be completely open to reconsideration."). After the elapse of that 
time period, both lower courts and the Supreme Court would not be 
bound by the decision, though they could of course follow its reason-
ing and logic. In effect, the decision would become something akin to 
an out-of-circuit precedent for a federal court of appeals, in that it 
would have no formal binding weight as law, but its reasoning could 
be cited as persuasive authority via an affirmative codification of the 
old decision. 
There are two principal reasons to adopt this approach. First, er-
ror correction. As human beings, judges necessarily will make mis-
takes. The liklihood of such mistakes is a function not only of 
cognitive biases and simple human error, but also of the time pres-
sures the Justices face. Because the Justices are deciding so many mo-
mentous issues at anyone time,29 it is difficult for them to reach 
agreements, particularly long-term binding ones, without error. Mis-
takes are particularly likely to occur in areas that are beyond the 
Court's expertise, matters in which judges have a tendency to over-
react, and circumstances where background facts are subject to con-
stant flux. Indeed, a decision might be appropriate when announced, 
but later events might collude to make the ruling ineffective or even 
wrong. Unlike Supreme Court doctrine, constitutional principles are 
self-consciously flexible and adaptable; as Chief Justice Marshall put it, 
the text is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, 
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. "30 
Instead of using devices that minimize the impact of systematic 
mistakes as part of a broader architecture of justice, our judicial sys-
tem has adopted a system to magnify it. Both the doctrine of stare 
decisis and the superiority of the Supreme Court over the lower courts 
exacerbate Supreme Court errors, the former over time, the latter 
over distance. The stare decisis principle is so entrenched into juris-
prudence that even when the Supreme Court realizes it made a mis-
take-such as Plessy v. Ferguson-it does not often admit the error.31 
29 See Michael C. Don, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. 
REv. 4, 40 (1998); Henry M. Hart, Foreword: The Time Charts of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. 
REv. 84 passim (1959). 
30 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis 
omitted). 
31 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (declining to overrule 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), simply mentioning that the Plessy ruling did 
not apply to schooling). In subsequent years, the Court applied the Brown equality 
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In these settings, and some others, the judicial sunset provides a 
method to prevent the automatic magnification of the mistake. The 
sunset gives the Court a way to convey its uncertainty about the long-
term effect of its holding. The Justices may come to a decision in a 
particular case, but fear that the underpinnings of its decision may 
evaporate over time. Or they may know themselves well enough to 
know that they may be overreacting to a potential crisis, but at the 
same time believe that a generalist court, in the midst of a national 
security emergency, should not hamstring the executive branch. 
Some might say that a judicial sunset is not necessary because the 
Court always retains the power to overrule itself. The same thing 
could be said of the legislature, which has the power to overrule itself 
and therefore arguably does not need a sunset provision either. The 
gambit here replaces reality with formalism: the Court rarely overrules 
itself, particularly given the strong adherence to stare decisis. And 
even if the Court became predisposed to reconsidering precedent 
more often, it would be difficult to signal to lower courts that the 
Court was ready to question one of its decisions. Instead, the matter 
would be likely taken as settled law, enshrined into the jurisprudence 
and accepted by lawyers and lower court judges alike. 
Second, agenda-setting. Without the aforementioned signal that 
the holding of a case is up for reconsideration, political actors and 
private parties are unlikely to take decisions that flout precedent. Su-
preme Court decisions are generally understood to be binding law, 
and the incentives are to stay within that precedent, or at most to nib-
ble around its edges. The upshot is that generating a test case to ques-
tion a precedent is not easy and requires potential parties to read the 
tea leaves of the Supreme Court and buck an established case. And if 
that task is hard for potential parties, it is even harder for the lower 
courts, who are under orders not to call Supreme Court cases into 
question or to anticipate an overruling by the Court.32 The only other 
real alternative is for litigants to resort to counting votes and retire-
ments, practices that assume that Justices cannot change their minds 
principle to places like beaches and buses, but never forthrightly admitted that Plessy 
was wrong. See Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (discussing 
beaches), affd memo 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 
1956) (discussing buses), affd memo 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
32 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of over-
ruling its own decisions."); see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 
180 (1990) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas). 
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as circumstances evolve. Ajudicial sunset, by contrast, puts the politi-
cal branches, the media, other judges, and litigants on all sides on 
notice that the holding is bound to be questioned at a date later in 
time. As such, the announcement of a sunset can invite these entities 
to develop a factual record and data about the wisdom of retaining a 
judicial rule. (Consider Judge Posner's Wittmer opinion, which in ef-
fect called upon the government to develop a factual basis for its boot-
camp affirmative action policy or face something akin to a sunset.33) 
A judicial sunset may even prompt the Court, should it decide to reaf-
firm a lapsed precedent, to do so in a way that articulates the true 
basis for its decision, instead of crutching its holding to what the 
Court has said before.34 
C. Three Problems 
1. Judicial Adventurism 
Judicial sunsets could be in tension with stare decisis and may 
jeopardize one of its principal aims: to limit the ability of anyone 
particular Court to impose its will on the nation. For example, in 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, the Court stated that if it were to 
overrule a previous decision, and apply that overruling only to future 
(and not present) litigants, it would "minimiz[e] the costs of overrul-
ing, and thereby allo[w] the courts to act with a freedom comparable 
to that of legislatures."35 From this perspective, the theory goes, stare 
decisis ensures that a contemporary Court, such as the Rehnquist 
Court, cannot depart too much from the Burger Court, the Warren 
Court, and so on. There is no doubt that, viewed in the backward 
looking direction of what the Rehnquist Court could do, respect for 
precedent can constrain decisionmaking. The rub, however, occurs 
when the temporal direction is flipped-and the point is made about 
how stare decisis empowers a contemporary Court to exert control 
over subsequent Supreme Court majorities far into the future. As dis-
cussed in Part LB, once a specific legal matter has been resolved by 
the Court, the formal rule of stare decisis, the informal constraint of a 
passive judiciary, and the existence of other agenda-setting limits all 
33 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996). The case is discussed in Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1789-90 (1997). 
34 Similar arguments have been made about legislative sunsets. See, e.g., AM. EN-
TERPRISE INSTITUTE, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION 26 (1978) ("Sun-
set would require an identification of program objectives" and "force simultaneous 
review of all programs having similar objectives or conflicting goals, thus forcing Con-
gress to reconcile the inconsistencies, to choose the best, and to discard the worst."). 
35 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991) (Souter,]., announcing the opinion of the Court). 
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may preclude that matter from arising again. This precedent-laden 
alternative to judicial sunsets permits nine, or as few as five,Justices of 
the Supreme Court to make a ruling that can last indefinitely-bind-
ing people who have not yet been born. While in many cases such a 
result may be acceptable, surely when our nation's most cherished 
freedoms are at stake, and when there is a strong tendency for our 
judiciary to overreact to a crisis, this grave expansion of judicial power 
must be resisted. 
A related criticism, however, is more acute: judicial sunsets give 
the Court a compromise option that enables them to experiment with 
broad deference to the government. A judicial sunset therefore can 
be antithetical to individual rights, because the Court will be tempted 
to defer to the Executive's broad claims and pay lip service to the no-
tion of watching the judicial experiment unfold in the years to follow. 
This is, no doubt, a serious problem, because legislative sunsets give 
crisis-struck Justices a way to side with the government today but ap-
pear to leave the door open later on for reconsideration. Yet a similar 
argument could be voiced against legislative sunsets as well-indeed, 
Senator Feingold made it against the USA PATRIOT ACt.36 And were 
we to live in a world where Justices were always omniscient and benev-
olent, and only sided against the government when appropriate, a 
sunset (and, for that matter, much constitutional law) would be un-
necessary. But in the real world, courts are already tempted to, in-
deed they do, uphold the executive branch at most turns today. It is 
hard to worry about sunset enabled judicial adventurism against a pre-
sent-day backdrop of adventurism. To the extent that adventurism oc-
curs, it may be just as likely to be in favor of individual liberty instead 
of national security. And because the sunset offers a way to temper 
the effects of any ruling adverse to the government, it enab!:::s experi-
mentation without necessarily incurring severe long-term costs. 
This argument should not be misunderstood as a criticism of the 
post-9/11 cases. Indeed, on many of the tough issues, I am inclined to 
side with the government. The point is, rather, a different one: we 
cannot be so sure of our constitutional views at this unique moment in 
our nation's history (a moment in which wars are often not formally 
declared, the enemy is not a state, and where modern technology en-
ables even lone actors to be extremely destructive). Such constitu-
tional doubts should be reflected in today's constitutional 
jurisprudence instead of being masked by legal platitudes. Yet the 
36 See Hosler, supra, note 22. Senator Feingold was quoted as saying, "My view is 
that if we say something is so bad we're only going to do it for two years, maybe we 
shouldn't be doing it at all." Id. 
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dominant legal conception is to have courts announce holdings as if 
they are obvious and settled for all time. If this strategy is successful, it 
will ultimately freeze hastily considered law into the books. And if it is 
not, it will mean that a later Court will be forced to overrule some of 
today's jurisprudential excesses-a painful process that can diminish 
respect for the rule of law and delay justice for far too long. 
2. Unsettled Law 
One danger of judicial sunsets is that they can diminish the au-
thority of Court pronouncements, and thereby make it harder for 
people to structure their affairs around a Court decision. This is a 
standard claim for stare decisis, that it helps resolve uncertainty 
around legal principles through long-lasting, authoritative, decision-
~aking.37 But that uncertainty is dissipated at a substantial cost-the 
possible freezing of bad law on the books. In response, some might 
be tempted to claim that bad law does not get frozen on the books 
because the Supreme Court is free to overrule itself. But that gambit 
ultimately fails in many cases, and not simply because of its rigid for-
malism. If the gambit is descriptively correct, in that the Court will 
overrule itself when necessary, then an ideal rule would be one that 
enabled the Court to put the parties and the nation on notice that 
such overruling is possible at a later point. Without that notice, peo-
ple can be caught unaware of the possibility of a switch-in-time, and 
therefore the effects from unsettled law can be far worse. 
Of course, such honesty has a cost. If the Court were to admit 
doubt about its ruling, it might diminish respect for the rule of law. 
Such arguments have been voiced against the practice of publishing 
dissents. 38 Yet those arguments were rejected with respect to dissents, 
37 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the "rule of 
law" .... [I]t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing princi-
ple within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and diffi-
cult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not 
based upon "an arbitrary discretion." 
[d.; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stating that stare decisis 
ensures that "the law will not merely change erratically" and "permits society to pre-
sume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of 
individuals") . 
38 Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White, J., 
dissenting) ("The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is 
to weaken the effect of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of confi-
dence in the conclusions of courts of last resort."). 
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and they should be rejected here as well. 39 There is no reason to 
think that the judicial confession that circumstances, facts, or even 
judgments may change over time will erode the judiciary's respect. 
Far from it. The public repression of jurisprudential doubt cannot 
last forever, and, like any other forced obfuscations, it eventually bub-
bles up to the surface. One symptom of this phenomena is the fact 
that the Court does overrule itself at times-despite its earlier pro-
nouncements about the wisdom of its decision.40 This point exposes 
the fault line in the oft-repeated claim that adherence to stare decisis 
is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of the Court. The reason why 
expectations settle around the earlier decision is the Court's refusal to 
admit doubt, its proclivity to "sweeping all the chessmen off the table," 
as Learned Hand put it.41 But a judicial sunset, by contrast, would 
permit expectations around a decision to be more realistic and more 
flexible. Indeed, if Hand's characterization of the dominant judicial 
writing style is correct, it underscores, all the more, the need for some 
mechanism that the present-day Court majority can use to alert subse-
quent jurists of its doubts and hesitations while crafting an opinion. 
Open, honest; communication between the judiciary and the 
public may have drawbacks, but one advantage is that it helps foster a 
truer sense of expectations about what the Court is likely to do regard-
ing a given set ofissues.42 Of course, such guidance is only one part of 
a viable legal system, for certainty can be purchased through any num-
ber oflegal rules (e.g., settling cases by the principle of which party's 
39 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67 
(1928). Justice Hughes noted that 
[d. 
[t]here are some who think it desirable that dissents should not be disclosed 
as they detract from the force of the judgment. Undoubtedly they do ... 
[b]ut unanimity which is merely formal, which is recorded at the expense of 
strong, conflicting views, is not desirable ... because what must ultimately 
sustain the court in public confidence is the character and independence of 
the judges. 
40 For example, regarding peremptory challenges, the Court stated in Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), that 
[the peremptory challenge] is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capri-
cious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full 
purpose ... [The presumption] that the prosecutor is using the State's chal-
lenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury ... is not overcome and the prose-
cutor therefore subjected to examination [where] all Negroes were removed 
from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes. 
!d. at 219, 222. Despite these claims, Swain was overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
41 LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTI' 131 (3d ed. 1960). 
42 Katyal, supra note 33, at 1800-02. 
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name comes first in the alphabet). The judicial sunset does not attain 
this level of certainty, nor should it. The need for certainty must be 
tempered by a willingness to reconsider vexing constitutional issues 
anew, for the wisdom of the Framers can be obscured through the fog 
of precedent.43 
3. Previous Parties 
A final problem concerns litigants who have already had their 
cases decided against them. Suppose that one of the Quirin Nazi sabo-
teurs who received a death sentence had received a life sentence in-
stead, and was still in jail. If the Supreme Court could reopen the 
question of whether military tribunals are constitutional today, its rul-
ing might have implications for the saboteur's life sentence. The re-
opening of such questions then puts courts in a pickle: should they 
apply their rulings retroactively, and thereby diminish the power of an 
adjudication in the case at hand, or should they ignore basic princi-
ples of equality?44 
There are two primary answers to this question. First, the prob-
lem here is not different than in any number of other areas of law 
where the Court has to struggle with whether to apply a new rule ret-
roactively.45 Consider, in the habeas context, Teague v. Lane,46 and in 
the civil context, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. GeorgiaY Indeed, it is 
"overwhelmingly the norm" to apply decisions retroactively,48 and the 
43 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARv. L. REv. 26 (2000). 
44 In this specific case, however, the argument is a weak one, as a claim challeng-
ers to today's tribunals would make is that, unlike with the Nazi saboteurs, no formal 
declaration of war has been made. 
45 Paul j. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of 
Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision 
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which limited the effect of court decisions 
to prospective application). 
46 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
47 501 U.S. 529 (1991). James B. Beam failed to obtain a majority opinion for the 
Court, but its principles were subsequently clarified (a bit) in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993): 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that 
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full 
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, 
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of 
the rule. 
Id. at 97. 
48 James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535; see also Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 
372 (1910) (Holmes, j., dissenting). 
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existence of judicial sunsets will do little to change that basic practice. 
Of course, a case may come along where the need for finality is so 
strong that it trumps equality concerns, and, if so, a case that reversed 
a lapsed precedent need not be given retroactive effect. But that is a 
point about retroactivity in general, and not something unique to the 
sunset. Second, as explained in the preceding section, judicial sunsets 
function by diminishing the settled expectations that cohere around a 
given case. If the parties and public know that an opinion announced 
in World War II might be questioned in subsequent years, then it al-
ters the expectations they may have about the adjudication itself. In 
this way, a chief worry of the retroactivity critics, that the overruling 
will upset a crystallized order, is diminished by the announcement of 
the sunset itself. 
II. Two EXAMPLES 
A. The Constitutionality of Military Tribunals 
The constitutionality of military tribunals is almost always cen-
tered around the meaning of Ex parte Quirin,49 the World War II case 
in which the Supreme Court permitted the military trial of Nazi sabo-
teurs. There are many things that might be said about the wisdom 
and legality of military commissions, but resolution of these disagree-
ments should not tum on the meaning of a sixty year old case. Leave 
aside the theatrics and dubious history of the case when it was decided 
(whereby the Supreme Court immediately ruled and only months 
later-after six of the saboteurs were executed-issued an opinion) ,50 
and ask yourself whether it makes sense to decide these fundamental 
questions by arguing about what the Supreme Court actually held in 
1942. That is a useless exercise.51 We should be asking ourselves 
whether commissions comport with the best understandings of separa-
tion of powers, due process, and fair play, not technical questions like 
whether the Supreme Court confined its holding to particular facts in 
the Quirin case, such as the declaration of war. 
49 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
50 See David]. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1]. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 passim (1996). 
51 The one way in which Quirin is relevant is as a statutory precedent. The best 
argument for congressional authorization of tribunals is that Congress reenacted the 
Articles of War as part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, and that 
Congress therefore enacted the Quirin Court's interpretation of the laws of war. Yet 
there are any number of reasons why this argument fails. See Katyal & Tribe, supra 
note 2, at 1284-305 (explaining why Congress in 1950 did not codify such a broad 
statutory precedent). 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1253 2003-2004
SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 1253 
Quirin is therefore not only old, it is actually strikingly different. 
For World War II was a war of limited duration, unlike the perpetual 
war against terror. Quirin itself dealt with a circumstance in which 
Nazi saboteurs showed up in German uniforms on American shores 
and promptly ditched them, thereby making their status as violators of 
the laws of war obvious, not like today where the enemy wears no uni-
form. Yet the fact that it is the Court's most recent pronouncement 
on military tribunals alone means that the decision becomes the focal 
point for resolving these issues today. 
It would be a striking thing if the Quirin Justices thought they 
were deciding the legality of military commissions for the next sixty 
years. They had no opportunity, despite their obvious disagreements 
on the case, to signal their hesitation. The only path open to the Jus-
tices was to dissent. Yet dissent could not fully capture what many on 
the Court may have felt-that they were in the midst of a World War 
and did not want to shackle the President at that moment. The vehi-
cle of judicial sunsets could have created a legal form for the expres-
sion of that feeling, while enabling those who shared that feeling to 
also express doubts about the long-term vitality of the Court's holding. 
But because Quirin has no sunset, we face a guessing game today 
as to whether the Rehnquist Court will feel itself bound by its rather 
loose reasoning. And in the interim, both sides of the debate proceed 
as if Quirin is good law, and read the decision in ways consistent with 
their beliefs about the constitutionality of the tribunals. This system 
invites the strategic distortion of Supreme Court precedent, and cre-
ates false jurisprudential parameters for resolving' such a momentous 
constitutional dispute. In my view, there are any number of reasons 
why we should treat Quirin as a lapsed precedent,52 but the resolution 
of such matters are too fundamental to be left up to bickering by par-
ties and judges who use arguments from precedent as smokescreens 
for policy objectives. Had the Supreme Court said in 1942 that the 
force of Quirin would lapse, it would have invited testing of its consti-
tutional reasoning and unleashed a process whereby the Court's con-
stitutional jurisprudence hews more closely to contemporary facts 
than antiquated and hastily made precedent. 
B. The Guantanamo Detainees and Habeas Corpus 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases that pre-
sent the question of whether those detained at Guantanamo Bay, 
52 See id. at 1290-306 (outlining these reasons). 
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Cuba, have recourse to the federal courts.53 The U.S. Government 
has taken the position throughout the litigation that they do not, fo-
cusing on Johnson v. Eisentrager, a case that arose after World War II, in 
which individuals who were convicted by a military tribunal asked 
whether they had the right to file habeas petitions. 54 The Supreme 
Court in Eisentrager answered this question in the negative.55 
In the current Supreme Court litigation, the lawyers for the 
Guantanamo detainees argue that the detainees have the right to file 
habeas petitions. There are two striking things about their claim, 
each of which underscores the need for judicial sunsets. First, even 
the petitioner-challengers do not really appear, at the time of this writ-
ing, to be questioning Eisentrager in any serious fashion. Eisentrager is 
taken by both parties as the golden rule-but when exactly did this 
fusty case become as important as the Constitution itself? The very 
fact that a half-century after the decision, the plaintiffs in the Guanta-
namo cases feel compelled to work within the Eisentrager framework, 
rather than to question it as bad law, speaks volumes about the need 
for judicial sunsets in this area. On a matter as fundamental as who 
has access to civilian courts, an old precedent decided in a different 
era should not control today's resolution of such events. (And this is 
particularly so when that precedent itself ignored longstanding earlier 
precedent that reached the opposite conclusion. 56) Yet not only the 
lawyers, but every court to have considered the issue, treats Eisentrager 
like the gospel. This reverence for precedent stultifies debate, impairs 
clear thinking, and does a disservice to constitutional government. 
Second, the parties in the case, at the time of this writing, have 
filed briefs that are in agreement that those convicted by lawful military 
tribunals at Guantanamo cannot file habeas petitions challenging the 
53 Al Odak v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), em. granted, 124 S. Ct. 
534 (2003). I represent the Military Defense Attorneys in the Office of Military Com-
missions as Amicus Curiae in this case. This Article does not, of course, speak for 
them in any way. 
54 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
55 [d. at 777-81. 
56 For discussions, see generally Brief of the Military Attorneys Assigned to the 
Defense in the Office of Military Commissions as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, AJ Odah v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 03-343), available 
at http://wwwjenner.com/files/tbLs69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5001911 
AmicusCuriae_Military_Attorneys.pdf; Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians in Sup-
port of the Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 03-334), AJ Odah v. 
United States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 03-343), available at http://wwwjenner. 
com I files I tbl_ s69NewsDocumentOrder / File Upload 500/901 amicuscuriae _Legal_ 
Historians_Brief. pdf. 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1255 2003-2004
SUNSETTING JUDICIAL UPINIUNS 
jurisdiction of the tribunals or the tribunals themselves.57 Why would 
a left-leaning group like the Center for Constitutional Rights take 
such a position? The answer is simple: to get around precedent. The 
Center's lawyers are arguing here, in effect, that Eisentragerwas correct 
but that it should be limited to those convicted by tribunals. 
There are any number of reasons why, on the merits, this view is 
exactly backwards, and why those who have faced tribunals have a bet-
ter claim to civilian jurisdiction than the ordinary detainee. But be-
cause Eisentragers precepts become the central focus of the case, those 
questions are not seriously asked by either party in the current litiga-
tion. Indeed, there is a tremendous risk that the Supreme Court will 
be tempted to take the concession by both sides as a strong sign that 
tribunal convicts cannot file habeas petitions. When announcing 
their holding, if they side with the government, the Court would then 
not even have to place a cautionary note in the opinion reserving the 
separate question of tribunals and access to the courts. They could 
simply state that no one at Guantanamo has the right to file a habeas 
petition. 
In a world with judicial sunsets, however, the path would be a lot 
easier. Eisentrager could have been limited in time, so that it would 
not be the focal point for today's resolution of the matter. And irre-
spective of whether a sunset should have been placed in Eisentrager 
itself, my claim is that today's Supreme Court in the Guantanamo 
cases could decide the issue for either side in a way that would pre-
serve, explicitly, the possibility of further review, and even force such 
review by employing a short time limit for the sunset. If the Court 
thought about the problem this way, then it would sidestep much of 
the risk of overreaching by barring tribunal convicts from ever having 
recourse to civilian justice. And in this way, irrespective of whether 
the government or the detainees win the bottom line, a sunset could 
resolve the case in a way that understood that Justices sometimes make 
mistakes, not only in the ultimate holding, but also in the loose lan-
57 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 
03-334) ("It is one thing to hold that war criminals ... cannot seek further review in a 
civilian court. It is quite another to extend that holding to people who have never 
been charged or afforded any process."); id. at 14 ("Unlike Petitioners, the prisoners 
seeking habeas relief in Johnson [v. Eisentrager] were convicted war criminals."); id. at 
17: 
[I]t is apparent that the Court sensibly concluded in Johnson that war 
criminals tried, convicted, and sentenced by a lawful commission, whose pro-
cedural protections were not the subject of complaint, were not 'due' any 
additional process in a civilian court; certainly they could not claim a Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from military trial. 
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guage they might be tempted to use (particularly when both sides 
make strategic concessions that make particular issues appear easier 
than they are). 
Finally, the use of a sunset permits later courts to more easily in-
corporate the impact of changes in the international and legal land-
scape. Had a sunset been used in Eisentrager, for example, it would be 
easier to take account of the earth-shattering revolutions in interna-
tionallaw (the 1949 Geneva Convention, ratified by the United States 
in 1955; the due-process revolution in the 1960's; the adoption of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951; liberalizations of both 
habeas and mandamus law). But because of the wooden insistence on 
stare decisis, it becomes very difficult for lawyers, lower court judges, 
and perhaps even the Supreme Court itself to evaluate these changes 
and how they transform the operating principles of the Second World 
War. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter contains the 
seeds of a new way of thinking about adjudication. While judicial sun-
sets may not be appropriate in all federal court settings, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court is deciding momentous national security cases, a sun-
set captures many of the advantages that its legislative counterpart 
has. In particular, it can avoid the problem of freezing bad law into 
place, allow for prompt reconsideration of possibly dubious decisions, 
and send a signal to litigants and others in our nation that a prece-
dent should be questioned. While a judicial sunset of a bad decision 
is not as great as getting the decision right the first time around, it is a 
good second-best one. That is why legislatures have come to embrace 
the sunset, and why the Court should, too. 
